

*Taula, quaderns de pensament*

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## JUSTIFICATION OF INNER EPISODES

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**ABSTRACT:** Sellars holds that there is non-inferential knowledge. In this paper, I examine Sellars's account of non-inferential knowledge and by doing so I hope to clarify his view on empiricism. I will argue that, although Sellars is critical of classical empiricism, nevertheless, he attempts to provide a justification for an empiricist insight through his own myth.

**KEY WORDS:** Empiricism, non-inferential knowledge, inner episodes, Sellars.

Wilfrid Sellars, in his essay, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, argues that there is knowledge that we acquire non-inferentially, and this non-inferentially attained knowledge is dependent on knowledge of other facts. By examining Sellars's discussion of non-inferential knowledge, I will attempt to understand Sellars's relation to traditional empiricism –more specifically, how his criticism of traditional empiricism contributes to his restoration of the insight that he inherits from traditional empiricism. First, I will discuss Sellars's criticism of sense-data theories. Sellars's attack on sense datum theories has two parts; one is concerned with the confusion between sensing and knowing, and the other is concerned with the status of «non-inferential knowledge». Sellars summarizes the impasse of sense datum theory as follows:

- A. *X senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that x is red.*
- B. The ability to sense contents is unacquired.
- C. The ability to know facts of the form  $x$  is  $\varphi$  is acquired (1997, 21).

I will discuss why these three statements are incompatible, and especially why statement A is problematic. Sellars chose sense datum theories as a paradigmatic case of «the Myth of the Given» in traditional empiricism. He acknowledges that there is a variety of sense datum theories and, although he doesn't note this specifically, sense datum theorists are not necessarily the primary target when he discusses the misconception of «non-inferential knowledge». So, whether Sellars's treatment of sense datum theories is fair is an open question. However, I will try to show that, despite his criticism of sense datum theories, Sellars tries to do justice to the sense datum theorists, specifically to the components of statement A. Furthermore, I will try to show that his analysis of the notion of «non-inferential knowledge» provides him with a way to reconfigure statement A. Sellars's reconstruction of A is what I will discuss in the second part of this paper; I will primarily discuss Sellars's story, «Our Rylean Ancestors» (1997, 90). Sellars discusses the logical status of two components of statement A, which are two kinds of inner episodes: thought and impression. He does this by telling us a story. His story of Rylean ancestors is his attempt to show how we can justify inner episodes (to which we one has a direct access) without the Myth of the Given. By the end of this paper, I hope that Sellars's use of the term 'non-inferential knowledge' becomes less problematic and that we see why he carefully analyzes the problems of traditional empiricism.

As a way to introduce Sellars's discussion of sense-datum theories, consider the following remark by Wittgenstein. In *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein writes, «How do I know that this colour is red? –It would be an answer to say: I have learnt English» (1958, 117). This answer «I have learnt English» doesn't seem to be an incorrect answer, and yet, there is something unsatisfying about it. One might be tempted to ask «what about the presence of a red object and one's seeing it?» , or «what about one's seeing an object *as red*?» It is true that I have learnt English and that's why I know English color words, but that's not the whole story.<sup>1</sup> Sense datum theorists would share

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<sup>1</sup> Here I'm using Wittgenstein's remarks for my purposes. I don't intend to imply that in this part of *Philosophical Investigations*, Wittgenstein is arguing against sense datum theorists. However, I think Wittgenstein is concerned with the Private Language Argument, which is quite relevant to Sellars's attack on the Myth of the Given.

an uneasy feeling about this answer «I have learnt English». They would say that one knows that the color one perceives is red because of one's awareness of red, which is more primary than one's linguistic ability. This pre-linguistic ability is what makes one recognize what sense datum theorists call «sense datum». According to sense datum theorists, one perceives a sense datum without any previous training or learning process, and, furthermore, one perceives the sense datum directly whereas one perceives the physical color of an object indirectly; when one perceives a red object, one directly perceives a sense datum that is red, and the red is the same red on the surface of the physical object. Sellars distinguishes sense data from sense content. The former indicates sense data that are actually perceived, and the latter indicates possible or potential sense datum. This is because there are some sense datum theorists who hold that the existence of sense data doesn't depend on the subject's perceiving it. Nonetheless, when a red object is perceived, it is as though there is a red sense datum between the mind's eye and the surface color of the physical object. At this point, one might become annoyed with these sense datum theorists and say «what is this thing you call sense datum? How can the red color of a physical object be the same as the color of non physical entity –namely, a sense datum?» Sellars raises this objection but this criticism alone is not strong enough to defeat sense datum theorists (1997, 47). They will defend their position by saying that the existence of sense data would explain why there are cases as the following. (i) One sees that *x* over there is red. (ii) It looks to one that *x* over there is red, when in fact *x* is not red. (iii) It looks to one that *x* over there is red, when there is no object over there. Sense datum theorists will argue that their theory will explain how these three experiences are related to one another.

Leaving this debate with sense datum theorists unresolved for the moment, let me discuss a slightly different question. The question Wittgenstein asks, «How do I *know* that this colour is red? » (my italics), depending on the context, could mean various things; it could mean that I'm not sure if this is red. If we take this question as an epistemological one, then this question is not asking for a phenomenological description of one's seeing a red object. Suppose that one answers this question by saying «when I see a red object, I just know that the color I see is red». This answer might not be an incorrect description of one's experience of seeing a red object, but it misses the point. The question «How do I know that this colour is red?» is asking for a justification of (one's utterance or) one's judgment that this is red. It is asking for an explanation of why the color is not purple or orange but red. One way to justify one's judgment is to say «I've seen this object before and it was red and it remains the same red» or «Most people, if not all, would say that this is red».

When one encounters the question «how do I know that this colour is red», (my italics), one might seek for a justification within one's experience of seeing a red object. One might think, for example, as I see a red object –that is, as I sense the redness of the object of perception– I know the color I see is red; when my eyes are focused on the object, my cognition is directed at the color of the object. It is as though knowing is a mental pointing to the object of perception. If one takes this experience of seeing a red object as a self-justifying incident of knowing, one is entering into the Myth of the Given; that is, «*X senses red sense content s entails x non-inferentially knows that s is red*» (Sellars 1997, 21). Sellars recognizes that sense datum theorists commit themselves into the following statements, which are, as a whole, incompatible.

- A. *X* senses red sense content *s* entails *x* non-inferentially knows that *x* is red.
- B. The ability to sense contents is unacquired.
- C. The ability to know facts of the form *x* is  $\phi$  is acquired (Sellars 1997, 21).

Sensing is not knowing. When one recognizes something as red or something as pain, one is making a judgment, i.e., relating a particular to a universal. As Sellars writes, «all subsumption of particulars under universals, involve learning» (1997, 20). According to sense datum theorists, however, sensing a particular entails (thanks to the mysterious entity, sense data or contents) knowing a fact about the particular. This creates the three incompatible statements. Sellars remarks that sense datum theorists confused the following two cases:

- (1) The idea that there are certain inner episodes – e.g. sensations of red or of C# which can occur to human beings (and brutes) without any prior process of learning or concept formation; and without which it would *in some sense* be impossible to *see*, for example, that the facing surface of a physical object is red and triangular, or *hear* that a certain physical sound is C#.
- (2) The idea that there are certain inner episodes which are the non-inferential knowings that certain items are, for example, red or C#; and that these episodes are the necessary conditions of empirical knowledge as providing the evidence for all other empirical propositions (1997, 21-2).

One can be conscious of what one is conscious of without there being two-step processes like «this» and then «red». What is sensed is a particular quality, the color red, but being conscious of a particular property of an object as red is an epistemic achievement. This epistemic achievement cannot be caused by sense perception. Epistemic facts are not reducible to non-epistemic facts (Sellars 1997, 19). Sellars holds that awareness is, insofar as it performs an epistemic function, *linguistic*. This is the view referred to as «psychological nominalism» (1997, 63). To say that awareness is linguistic means that to be aware of something is a conceptual task; it is to locate the object of awareness within a system of concepts. This doesn't mean that experience is reducible to linguistic expressions but that if one's awareness is to count as knowledge, it has to be expressible and justifiable in the language in which one thinks. As one learns one's first language, one learns what to pay attention to. (I will have one more occasion to comment on his psychological nominalism.)

One might wonder why Sellars needs to discuss sense datum theories at all. He can just present his psychological nominalism without relying on his criticism of sense datum theories. I think Sellars discusses sense datum theory because the idea (2) discussed earlier is not wrong even though we cannot assume that (1) and (2) are the same inner episode, or that (1) is the cause of (2). Eventually, Sellars defends the idea that there are both kinds of inner episode and each individual has privileged access to them, however, at this point the logical status of inner episodes is not yet argued for, and he is trying to show that it is possible to provide an account of non-inferential knowing that doesn't require a reference to inner episodes.

The claim (2) itself is not the Myth of the Given. An example of (2) would be this; I see a red object and I am aware that the object I see is red. My experience of seeing this red object is evidence for the proposition I hold «this is red». This is a paradigmatic case

of observation knowledge. What makes the claim (2) a Myth of the Given is a mistaken conception of «non-inferential knowing», which holds that non-inferential knowing presupposes no other knowledge. The awareness «this is red» is based on observation and does not depend on knowledge of other facts. Rather, knowing «this is red» depends on the relation between the subject, the physical object, and the quality red. That is, knowing «this is red» depends on something's looking red to someone. This episode of something's looking red to oneself is referred to as «having a sense impression or an "immediate experience" ». One doesn't need any kind of learning in order to be aware of this episode. The episode of something's looking red to oneself is a non-verbal episode and is simply observable to the subject of the experience; it is «self-authenticating» (Sellars 1997, 73). The observation knowledge «this is red» is an expression of this non-verbal episode and this kind of observation knowledge «this is red» forms a foundation for inferential knowledge, but not vice versa.

Against this view, Sellars argues that the awareness «this is red» does not depend on «something's looking red to someone», that is, «this is red» is not a statement about a relation between a subject, an object and the object's color, red; he argues that «this is red» is logically independent of something's looking red to someone. Furthermore, he argues that looks-locution presupposes knowledge of is-locution, that is, is-locution is conceptually primary than looks-locution. Here Sellars's target is, rather than the confusion of sensing and knowing, the idea that observation knowledge does not depend on, or require, any knowledge of facts. What he wants to show is that observation knowledge depends on inferential knowledge and vice versa: thus to show that observation knowledge as a foundation of empirical knowledge is a misleading metaphor and that it is not the case that all knowledge is inferentially related. Sellars considers the following claim expressing the inter-dependence of non-inferential knowledge and inferential knowledge.

x is red iff x looks red to standard observers in standard conditions (1997, 43).

I will refer to the antecedent as P and the consequent as Q, so «P iff Q». Sellars wants to show how one can maintain this claim «P iff Q» without P's being reducible to Q, which then would make the claim «P iff Q» circular. I will discuss Sellars's argument on this issue in a moment, but before I do so, let me introduce a story Sellars tells us. This story is a historical fiction, and although it is not itself an argument, provides a good illustration of arguments he will make explicit. The main character of the story is John who works at a necktie shop, and the story consists of three parts. In part one, we are introduced to the usual John. In part two, we see John encounter a challenge while he talks to his neighbor Jim. In part three, we see the change Jim brought to John's life.

The usual John is like ordinary people except this, that he has always perceived color in a standard lighting condition. He hasn't had a chance to experience that a color of an object looks different under different lighting conditions. It might be fair to say that John lacks the concept of «standard lighting condition» or the relation between light and perception. Whenever John says «this is blue» or «this is green» as he points to a necktie, which is his daily routine, his peers agree with him and John has never confronted an objection to his remarks on color. In terms of color, what he sees is what it is.

However, one day, electric lighting is installed in the shop where John works and this brings a challenge to him. It happens to be that the necktie shop is the last one to adopt

this new lighting invention in the neighborhood, so John is less familiar with the effect of electric lighting than his neighbors. He is not aware of his lack of familiarity with this lighting method when he has the following conversation with Jim.

«Here is a handsome green one», says John.  
 «But it *isn't* green», says Jim, and takes John outside.  
 «Well», says John, «it was green in there, but now it is blue»,  
 «No», says Jim, «you know that neckties don't change their color merely as a result of being taken from place to place»,  
 «But perhaps electricity changes their color and they change back again in daylight?»  
 «That would be a queer kind of change, wouldn't it?» says Jim.  
 «I suppose so», says bewildered John. «But we *saw* that it was green *in there*».  
 «No, we didn't see that it was green in there, because it wasn't green, and *you can't see what isn't so!*» (my italics)  
 «Well, this is a pretty pickle», says John. «*I just don't know what to say*». (1997, 37-8).

After this incident, John doesn't say «this is green» as he points to the tie, which he would normally do. If one asks what color the tie is, John would say «this is blue» even though the tie doesn't look blue to him. Being asked, he is at first tempted to say «this is green» but he remembers what Jim told him and says «this is blue». By saying «this is blue», John is stating a fact but not reporting what he perceives. What does he perceive then? He would answer, «it looks green to me, but I know it isn't green». Sellars points out that there are two functions this type of sentence «this is green» can perform; one is fact stating, and the other is reporting (1997, 38). In the case of John, when he says «this is blue» we see the separation between these two functions. John is stating a fact but not reporting his perceptual experience. John's utterance «this is blue» is not an expression of the relation between John, the tie and its color, blue.

Of course, John doesn't represent each and every one of us. When we say «it looks red to me», why do we say that «it looks green to me» instead of «it is red»? Sellars argues that saying «this is red» is more than describing what one is experiencing. «This is red» is an expression of the propositional content of what one is experiencing and also an expression of one's attitude toward the truth value of this proposition. By saying «this is red» one is characterizing one's experience as seeing that something is red and is expressing that one takes this characterization to be true. Let's compare this case with two other related ones. Saying «it looks red to me» is a modification of the case above. When one says «this looks red», one does so because one notices something that makes one withhold the validity of «this is red» –for example unusual lighting condition or one's poor eyesight. If, however, it turns out that the object one sees is actually red, then one might say, «at first I thought it looked red, but it turns out that it is red». What this second case shares with the first case (when one says «this is red») is the possibility of having the same experience of seeing a red object and the same propositional content.

When one says «it looks as though there is a red object», here one is uncertain about both the existence of an object over there and its being red. And yet, if it turns out that there is a red object over there, then, in principle, it's possible that one is having the same experience of the first case –seeing something to be red. The three cases share the possibility of having the same experience– seeing a red object. Sellars writes,

«x looks red to S» has the sense of «S has an experience which involves in a unique way the idea *that x is red* and involves it in such a way that if this idea were true, the experience would correctly be characterized as a seeing that x is red.» (1997, 49)

This account provides a way to understand how the three situations relate to one another without sense data or impressions, or «immediate experience».

- (a) Seeing that x, over there, is red
- (b) Its looking to one that x, over there, is red
- (c) Its looking to one as though there were a red object over there (1997, 49-50).

The differences between the three cases can be accounted for in terms of one's endorsement of the truth value of the judgment «x is red». Sellars is not arguing that «this is red» has no relation to «something's looking red to someone». When I make a judgment, «this is red», the object I see *looks* red to me. What Sellars rejects is the idea that something's being red is defined by its looking red to someone. Something's looking red cannot justify its being red because «this is red» is not a mere report of one's perceptual experience. Rather, «this is red» can perform both functions (fact stating and reporting) and yet it is logically distinct from «this looks red to me».

Being able to recognize, or to say, «this is red» is an accomplishment that presupposes knowledge of other facts such as that what one is experiencing agrees with one's previous experience of the same kind or that the lighting conditions are standard. Sellars writes,

The ability to recognize that something *looks green*, presupposes the concept of *being green*, and that the latter concept involves the ability to tell what colors objects have by looking at them – which, in turn, involves knowing in what circumstances to place an object if one wishes to ascertain its color by looking at it. (1997, 43)

Q (x looks red to standard observers under standard conditions) relies on P (x is red) in that when one recognizes something's looking red, one makes this judgment in relation to the concept of something's being red, e.g. «it looks red, i.e., it might be red». P relies on Q in that, in order to be able to recognize what is the case, e.g. «x is red», one must understand what the word «red» refers to and also *when it is the right circumstance in which to utter this sentence*, that is, whether his or her use of the sentence «x is red» is justifiable to others. One notices something from observation because one is equipped with not only the concept of what one notices but also with the usage of the concept, which is a social practice.<sup>2</sup> Not only does empirical knowledge depend on observation knowledge, the latter depends on the former.

So far, Sellars has revealed two major components of the Myth of the Given. One is conflating sensing and knowing (two inner episodes 1 and 2) and the other is non-inferential knowledge presupposing no other knowledge. According to Sellars, however, the source of the myth remains intact, which is the idea that, to put it crudely, the human

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<sup>2</sup> Sellars writes, «For we now recognize that instead of coming to have a concept of something because we have noticed that sort of thing, to have the ability to notice a sort of thing is already to have the concept of that sort of thing, and cannot account for it». (1997, 87)



mind is prepared for what it becomes. For example, a child who has started learning his or her first language already has a conceptual scheme in his mind that is the same as grown-ups. It is as though there is a place-holder for concepts in the child's mind and all he needs to do is to learn words that stand for the concepts (Sellars 1997, 65). As a grown-up teaches the word «red» by pointing to a red object and saying «this is red», a pre-linguistic thought of red in the child's mind meets the word «red», and this gives the child the associative power to link the word «red» with red objects. The meaning of the word «red» depends on the child's mental state –more specifically, the aboutness of his thought.

Sellars does not deny that our utterance expresses what we mean to express. However, he holds that the meaning of words does not depend on the intentionality of the language user. Besides the fact that there are words that do not name an object or a visible quality of an object one can point to, Sellars remarks that the semantical statement, «X» means Y, does not indicate an associative power of the subject or the relation between linguistic entity with non-linguistic entity. For example, the sentence, «“Rot” means red» can be understood by a functional analysis of those words «rot» and «red» (Sellars 1997, 67). That is, in German, «rot» plays a role that is analogous to the role «red» plays in English. The meaning of «rot» can be explained through its relation to other words in the language system to which it belongs, not through its relation to the mind of the speaker of the word. The truth of a semantical statement does not tell us, nor does it rely on, the intentionality or the associative power of the speaker (or what is in the subject's mind, his *thought*).<sup>3</sup> Sellars's account of meaning is implied in the story of John. John sees the tie as green when he says «this is green». Nevertheless, his seeing the tie as green does not justify his use of the word «green», because the tie isn't green. Sellars is not arguing that the idea of intentionality is a chimera. He is arguing that intentionality is guided by the category of the language. Sellars's psychological nominalism is the idea that all awareness, in so far as it is epistemic, is linguistic. Therefore, the ability to be aware of something depends on the mastery of language. Sellars writes, «the primary connotation of “psychological nominalism” is the denial that there is any awareness of logical space prior to, or independent of, the acquisition of a language» (1997, 66). Our thought is not identical with our language, but, as we learn our first language, we learn how to think.

Hence, the way Sellars justifies inner episodes (e.g. thoughts and impressions) starts with a concept (a word) for inner episodes. He attempts to show how a concept of inner episodes as a mere idea or a mere name becomes the name of an observable entity. We notice what we notice because we have a concept of what we notice, even if it is our own thought and even if we have privileged access to our own thoughts. Sellars's account of inner episodes has to reconcile public aspect of this concept of inner episodes with the privacy of what the concept refers to (1997, 87). Sellars's strategy for this task is hinted

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<sup>3</sup> In his letter to Chisholm, August 31, 1956, Sellars says the following: «It is in principle possible to conceive of the characteristic forms of semantical discourse being used by a people who have not yet arrived at the idea that there are such things as thoughts. They think, but they don't know that they think. Their use of language is meaningful because it is the expression of thoughts, but they don't know that it is the expression of thoughts; that is to say, they don't know that overt speech is the culmination of inner episodes of a kind which we conceive of as thoughts» (Chisholm and Sellars 1972, 226).



at in John's story. Whether something is known inferentially or not has no fixed relation to the object known. For example, whether the knowledge is about the color of an object doesn't determine whether it is known inferentially or not. The sentence, «this is blue», does not necessarily express the knowledge one acquires non-inferentially. Sellars will show how an inner episode as a theoretical episode (what can be known inferentially) becomes an observable episode (what can be known non-inferentially). He shows this possibility through the myth of Rylean ancestors.

Ryleans are people who think and speak without knowing that they think. They don't have a concept of inner episodes such as intention, desire or sensation. The language they master has words for properties of physical objects, and the Ryleans are familiar with utterances regarding observable facts. Sellars asks, «What resources would have to be added to the Rylean language of these talking animals in order that they might come to recognize each other and themselves as animals that think, observe, and have feelings and sensations, as we use these terms?» (1997, 92). Sellars first discusses how they acquire the conception of 'thought' that we have, and then moves to the conception of «impression». In both cases, Jones, who is an exceptional figure among the Ryleans, plays the major role.

Jones constructs a theory that there is such a thing as an inner speech that is the cause of an overt speech. He refers to this inner speech as «a thought». According to his theory, one's utterance «Look! Here is a giraffe!» is caused by «an inner utterance of this sentence» (1997, 103). Overt speech is a model for this conception of an inner speech (or a thought) but the latter is not an exact copy of the former. An inner utterance is not exactly an utterance; rather it is like a seed that causes overt speech. A thought becomes explicit in the outer utterance, and in that sense overt speech is the culmination of the thought.

Jones and his fellow Ryleans have started examining this hypothetical entity, thought, and practiced having a discourse about thought. For example, when a person says «I will have lunch now», they would infer that the person has a thought «I will have lunch now» or that the person thinks that he will have lunch now. At this stage, their talk about thoughts is a theoretical discourse. Thoughts are not yet observable entities. Even at this stage, however, a theoretical discourse on thought can be quite rich, in that the Ryleans can make a semantic statement about a thought. As the semantic statement «X» means Y doesn't imply anything about mental states, the Ryleans, who don't have the concept of a thought we (non-Ryleans) have, can have semantic discourses. What this means is that the aboutness of their semantic statement can be applied to the aboutness of thoughts, that is, the category of the Rylean language can be the category of their thoughts.

When Jones and his friends are engaged in the theoretical discourse on thought, they are always mindful of the practical consequences of Jones's theory. They are always concerned with the possible correspondence between the theoretical discourse on thoughts and a familiar non-theoretical discourse on thoughts. Luckily, their effort is rewarded. In a theoretical discourse on thoughts, they infer P from one's utterance that «P». This discourse can be extended to one's own utterance. I say «P» and I can infer that I am thinking that «P». As the Ryleans practice this form of discourse on thought in relation to the first person pronoun «I», they discover that each person has privileged access to his or her own thought. Each person is the only one who doesn't have to infer the thought he or she has and is the only one who can observe and make a report of the

thought. Sellars writes, «What began as a language with a purely theoretical use has gained a reporting role» (1997, 107). Originally, the Ryleans had no conception of inner episodes and their language was primarily public. But now they have acquired the conception of inner episodes and became able to utilize this concept in their ordinary conversation.

We have already reached the finale of the Rylean story: Jones's theory of impressions. This part of the story has a similar plot to the development of Jones's theory of thoughts. Jones develops a theory of impression. By «impression», Jones means a state of a perceiver, an inner episode that functions as a replica of a physical object of perception — more specifically, a replica of the qualities of the object. An impression is a theoretical episode *in* the perceiver. One thing to note is that, in this theory, an impression is not an inner perception; it is not a copy of seeing a physical object. If that's the case, an impression steps into the realm of thoughts. Seeing a red object is already an epistemic awareness, so Jones's theory of impressions has to be differentiated from thoughts. In his theory of «impression», an impression is, for example, an impression of a red object (not of seeing a red object), and an impression of a red object is a replica (we, non-Ryleans might call it an image) of a physical object that is red.

As in the case of thoughts, an impression is not an exact copy of its source, a physical object. An impression is a mental state, not a physical object; it is a kind of mark a perceived object leaves in the perceiver's inner state. In Jones's theory, impressions are not a particular even though their model is a particular physical object. As this theoretical concept of impressions has to be examined in theoretical discourse, Jones and his friends practice a discourse on impressions. For example, when they ascribe a case of seeing a red object to a perceiver, they infer that the person is having an impression of a red object. Now, it is predictable that the Ryleans apply this theoretical concept to their own perceptual experiences. Jones notices that he doesn't have to infer that he has an impression of red when he observes his experiences. Jones also notices that when he sees a sunset, he has an impression of red, even though the setting sun is not as red as the red object he saw. An impression of red is similar to a red physical object (which is a particular) in the sense that it is different from an impression of blue. However, an impression of red is unlike the color of an object in that it is not as determinate or determinable as a particular red color of a physical object. Furthermore, Jones discovers that when he is not certain about the color of the object he perceives, or even when his eyes are closed, he can have an impression of red. Hence, Jones finds out that when one's perceptual judgment is uncertain, confused or mistaken, a perceiver's inner state, an impression, is often what is responsible for the unreliable judgment.

Sellars doesn't present this story as an illustration of how we actually learn the concept of inner episodes. He is not concerned with language acquisition. What he wants to illustrate is the logical possibility of the Ryleans having conceptions of inner episodes. If that is possible, then we can begin the philosophy of mind without the Myth of the Given. In the story of the Ryleans, neither «thoughts» nor «impressions» are posited as an «immediate experience». Those concepts are learned, and ways of speaking about these concepts are practiced. In Jones's theories, the concept of inner episodes is «*built on* and *presupposes* this intersubjective status» (Sellars 1997, 107). And yet, the inner episodes the Ryleans are now aware of are private and not reducible to overt speech or behavior. Each Rylean has privileged access to his or her own inner episodes, and they

have acquired an ability to reflect on themselves. The Ryleans introspect but, as we all do, «[they] introspect in terms of common sense mentalistic concepts» (Sellars 1997, 99).

The discussion of the logical possibility of the Ryleans having concepts of inner episode might seem a little too sketchy. This Sellarsian myth, however, replaces the myth of the given and therefore, provides a logical ground for «inner episodes». In his essay, *Empiricism and the Philosophy of Mind*, Sellars gradually reveals the source of the Myth of the Given and separates the conception of «non-inferential knowing» from the assumption that we simply notice what is given to us. By arguing the interdependence of observation knowledge and inferential knowledge, Sellars shows that empiricism can do without the myth of the given; empirical knowledge is «a self-correcting enterprise» (1997, 79), and this self-correcting process doesn't have to be grounded in introspection.

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